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Abstract. Directed contact networks (DCNs) are a particularly flexible
and convenient class of temporal networks, useful for modeling and ana-
lyzing the transfer of discrete quantities in communications, transporta-
tion, epidemiology, etc. Transfers modeled by contacts typically underlie
flows that associate multiple contacts based on their spatiotemporal re-
lationships. To infer these flows, we introduce a simple inhomogeneous
Markov model associated to a DCN and show how it can be effectively
used for data reduction and anomaly detection through an example of
kernel-level information transfers within a computer.
1 Introduction
To identify and prevent data exfiltration by advanced persistent threats (APTs),
it is useful to analyze graphs that encode causality data about system activities.
The form of this causality data varies widely among providers, but it can be cari-
acatured as tagged and tracked information (micro-)transfers. In practice, these
are realized as annotations of system calls or similar kernel-level events [3,8]. We
have found the following intermediate representation or summary useful:
(timestamp, subject , verb, object).
In our tools, this takes the explicit form
(timestamp, (process name, process ID), event type,filename) (1)
where the “everything is a file” philosophy applies to the last entry (e.g., for a
fork event, the filename is the forked process ID).
Meanwhile, any causal representation of the transfer of some token must
involve a source s, a target t, and some notion of the time τ at or over which
the transfer occurs. The simplest notion of such a time is a single instant, and
the resulting notion of a (directed) contact as an ordered triple (s, t, τ) is not
only the simplest, but also a very general causal representation of a transfer. For
example, a transfer from a source s to a target t over the time interval [τ0, τ1]
could be represented with the two contacts (s, ∗, τ0) and (∗, t, τ1), where here ∗
is a shorthand for the triple (s, t, [τ0, τ1]).
1
1 A useful analogy is of a flight departing from s at τ0 and arriving at t at τ1: the
contacts (s, ∗, τ0) and (∗, t, τ1) respectively correspond to embarking and debark-
ar
X
iv
:1
81
0.
10
90
3v
1 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 25
 O
ct 
20
18
2 S. Huntsman
Many kernel-level events have an unambiguous directionality with respect
to potential information transfer. For example, if process A closes file X, this
might entail deleting X, which can be regarded as a degenerate information
transfer from A to X (i.e., overwriting X and its metadata with ∅), but there
is no possibility of information transfer from X to A as a result of the closure
per se. Similarly, if A forks process B, information might be transferred from
A to B as part of the fork, but not the other way around. In both of these
examples the source A can reasonably be interpreted as “writing” to a target
in some sense. Events which can be viewed as generalized reads or writes in
this way naturally correspond to directed contacts. Other events do not have an
unambiguous directionality, and as such conservatively correspond to pairs of
directed contacts with the source and target swapped (e.g., the act of opening a
file can entail a [generalized] read or write).
This paper focuses on how replacing each event of the form (1) with either one
or two contacts provides a further useful abstraction of causality/transfer data
that is mathematically convenient. In particular, we show how a natural model
arises for probabilistically modeling potential flows. This model involves just one
parameter, and there is a simple heuristic for setting it that we follow in practice.
We detail the model behavior through analytical and practical examples. It is
important to note at the outset that the model is not statistical in the sense that
it involves no learning, fitting, optimization, etc. Its construction instead follows
the tradition of physics by starting from various required symmetries (e.g., time
translation invariance) that any model built from contacts ought to obey and
deriving the most general mathematical structure that is consistent with those
symmetries. As a byproduct of this generality, the model also applies to related
problems that can be modeled using directed contact networks, e.g. for network
traffic analysis or disease surveillance.
The difference between (1) and a directed contact is manifested in two graphs
that we have used to analyze system behavior. The enterprise provenance graph
(EPG) is morally an undirected multigraph, with vertices labeled by files (includ-
ing processes) and edges labeled by event types and timestamps. 2 The temporal
digraph (TD) is directed, with vertices labeled by ordered pairs of files and times-
tamps, spatial arcs corresponding to contacts as outlined above, and temporal
arcs linking files through time. While the EPG has demonstrated its utility in
several forensic challenges under the DARPA Transparent Computing program
and supports time-aware backtracking [9], it represents the passage of both time
and (potentially) information implicitly through annotations, sacrificing explicit
structure for precision and expressiveness. The TD places this same structure
above other considerations (though its arcs could also easily be annotated with
summarized events). This has several distinct benefits: for example, it turns the
ing. This analogy also highlights that alternative representations could also include
additional contacts (s, ∗, τ∗) with τ0 ≤ τ∗ < τ1 depending on the desired behavior.
2 In fact the EPG is a directed graph with vertices bipartitioned into files and events;
arcs indicating a subject or object go from events to files. However, there is an
obvious bijective correspondence between this and our moral characterization.
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backtracking problem into a trivial breadth-first search, and also naturally leads
to the model at the heart of the present paper.
Notwithstanding the context of information transfer, the closest work to ours
is [17], which demonstrates that the most probable paths in a Markovian model of
a very complicated temporal network (viz., ocean water transport in the Mediter-
ranean) suffice to describe the network’s key features. The particulars of our
model and context are very different apart from the gross feature of Markovity,
but our conclusion is essentially identical: the most probable paths/flows suffice
for capturing the key information dynamics. This particularly includes highly
probable but nevertheless infrequent (or one-time) flows that reliably capture
anomalous or even malicious behavior.
The paper is structured as follows: §2 introduces directed contact networks
and temporal digraphs; §3 discusses our Markov model; §4 discusses its perfor-
mance in data reduction and anomaly detection, and §5 concludes the paper.
2 Directed contact networks and temporal digraphs
Digraphs admit a natural temporal generalization called directed contact net-
works (DCNs) that are a particularly simple incarnation of temporal networks
[6,11]. While we can think informally of DCNs as collections of contacts as de-
scribed in §1, this allows certain degenerate situations to occur that a slightly
more formal and restrictive notion will avoid. Towards this end, a DCN with
vertex set V ≡ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n} is a finite nonempty set C for which each con-
tact c ∈ C corresponds to a unique triple (s(c), t(c), τ(c)) ∈ [n] × [n] × R with
s(c) 6= t(c); when convenient we identify contacts and their corresponding triples.
There is an obvious notion of a temporally coherent path which we do not bother
to write out formally but which is indicated in Figure 1.
Define the temporal digraph of C (see Figure 1 for an example) to be the
digraph T (C) with vertex and arc sets
V (T (C)) := {(v,±∞) : v ∈ V }
∪{(v, τ(c)) : [(v, c) ∈ V × C] ∧ [s(c) = v ∨ t(c) = v]} (2)
A(T (C)) := {((s(c), τ(c)), (t(c), τ(c))) : c ∈ C}
∪{((v, τ@vj−1), (v, τ@vj )) : v ∈ V, j ∈ [|C@v| − 1]} (3)
where the temporal fiber at v is
C@v := {±∞} ∪ {τ(c) : c ∈ C ∧ (s(c) = v ∨ t(c) = v)} ≡ {τ@vj }|C@v|−1j=0 . (4)
The first set in the union on the RHS of (3) is the set of temporal arcs; the second
set is the set of spatial arcs. Note that |V (T (C))| = ∑v |C@v| ≤ 2|V |+ 2|C| and
|A(T (C))| = |V (T (C))| − |V |+ |C| ≤ |V |+ 3|C|, so that T (C) can be formed with
only linear overhead (though this requires some care in practice).
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s, t = 1
2
3
4
5
τ = 0 1 2 3 4 5
Fig. 1. Temporal digraph of the DCN C := {(1, 4, τ1), (5, 4, τ2), (2, 5, τ3), (4, 3, τ4)} with
τ1 < τ2 < τ3 < τ4. Note that there is a temporally coherent path from C-vertices 1 to 3
(indicated with bold versus gray arrows), but not from 2 to 3. Spatial (resp. temporal)
arcs are vertical (resp. horizontal); temporal fibers are vertices along horizontal paths.
3 Markov model associated to a DCN
The reader may initially be skeptical that a useful probabilistic model of poten-
tial information flow can be built upon T (C) alone. However, this claim of utility
merely asserts that ubiquitous traffic-analytic products such as pen registers or
trap and trace devices (defined in 18 USC §3127) actually produce data that
allow a user to make substative inferences about the sources and diffusion of
information in a communications network. In this light, the claim is obviously
supported by general knowledge that informs the basic assumption of the model.
Namely, suppose we have contacts of the form (A,B, 0) and (B,C, τ): the
model probability that information (potentially) flows from A to C ought to
decrease from unity to zero as τ ↑ ∞. It is important to note that this behavior
does not entail that the model will have problems with capturing APTs: even
a “low and slow” data exfiltration is almost certain to involve at least some
system call-scale directed contacts that are either unusual in their own right or
are temporally localized.
Besides the qualitative requirement above, a reasonable model that assigns
probabilities to the arcs of T (C) is tightly constrained by a number of basic
symmetries that it must obey, namely w.r.t.
i) vertices (probabilities assigned to spatial arcs must not explicitly depend on
their source or target);
ii) time windowing (the model must yield probabilities for information flows
from a source at an initial time to a target at a terminal time that coherently
compose over different sets of adjacent time windows spanning the same
interval);
iii) non-local behavior (probabilities assigned to temporal arcs must only depend
on their duration and the number of spatial arcs sharing the same source);
iv) simultaneous vs. infinitesimally separated events (the probabilities for these
cases must only differ infinitesimally).
For the sake of brevity, we will simply construct a model that uniquely satisfies
these properties, without formally interpreting them or giving proofs. However,
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the nature and proof of these properties should be reasonably evident to the
mathematically inclined reader from the construction itself.
Define the restriction of a DCN C to X ⊂ R by C|X := τ−1(τ(C)∩X), i.e., the
subset of contacts with times in X. Next, for a1 /∈ τ(C) 3 and a0 < a1, consider
the restricted temporal digraph T (C)|[a0,a1) obtained by modifying T (C|[a0,a1))
by replacing instances of −∞ and∞ in (2) with a0 and a1, respectively, keeping
the form of (3) apart from analogous replacements in (4). That is, T (C)|[a0,a1)
is obtained from T (C|[a0,a1)) by replacing the second component of the vertices
(v,−∞) with a0 and the second component of the vertices (v,∞) with a1, while
retaining all the arcs.
We now introduce a physically inspired model of temporally coherent random
paths in which an “inverse temperature” β ∈ R governs a balance between
temporal and spatial arcs in a temporal digraph. 4 Specifically, for ε ≥ 0, a0 <
· · · < aM with a := {am}Mm=0, a ∩ τ(C) = ∅, and m ∈ [M ], we form the Markov
chain on V (T (C)|[am−1,am)) with transition matrix P (β,ε)(C,a,m) defined by
Z(v,τ@vj ) · P
(β,ε)
(C,a,m)((v, τ
@v
j ), (w, τ
@w
k )) := (5)
1 if [v 6= w] ∧ [τ@vj = τ@wk ]
max(ε, exp(−β[τ@vj+1 − τ@vj ])) if [v = w] ∧ [j + 1 = k] ∧ [d+(v,τ@vj+1) > 0]
max(ε, exp(−β[τ@v+(a,m) − τ@vj ])) if [v = w] ∧ [j + 1 = k] ∧ [d+(v,τ@vj+1) = 0]
1 if [v = w] ∧ [j = k] ∧ [d+
(v,τ@vj )
= 0]
0 otherwise.
Here τ@v+(a,m) := min(inf[(am,∞) ∩ C@v], aM ), the Z(v,τ@vj ) are defined so that
the rows of P
(β,ε)
(C,a,m) sum to unity, and d
+ denotes outdegree in T (C)|[am−1,am).
Figure 2 shows a simple example.
The details of (5) might appear very arbitrary, but upon examination it can
be seen that quite the opposite is true. The provision for ε > 0 makes it possible
to avoid degeneracies in silico 5, whereas the absolute requirement a∩τ(C) = ∅ is
imposed to ensure that the Markov chain defined by (5) has exactly n absorbing
3 If a1 ∈ τ(C), we can simply consider instead a′1 = a1 + εC , where εC :=
1
2
mint,t′∈τ(C),t 6=t′ |t − t′|. Note that here we assume without loss of generality that
|τ(C)| > 1, i.e., that C is nontrivial as a DCN (versus, e.g., a digraph).
4 Bearing the idea of negative absolute temperature [14] in mind, we note that
β = −∞ corresponds to “absolute hot”, and β = ∞ corresponds to absolute zero.
We follow a natural convention (and it is nothing more) for our model, in which
lower temperatures correspond to slower dynamics: thus β ↑ ∞ and β ↓ −∞ are re-
spectively limits in which no temporal and spatial arcs are traversed. In practice,
we follow a physical analogy and set β−1 to the average time between
contacts.
5 If there are (say) contacts of the form (v, w, τ∗) and (w, v, τ∗) with τ∗ = τ@v|C@v|−2 =
τ@w|C@w|−2, then (5) entails that the probability of a transition from (v, τ∗) to (v, am)
or from (w, τ∗) to (w, am) would be exponentially small were it not for the ε term.
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states, all of the form (v, am). Each of these has the corresponding “emitting”
state (v, am−1), and so it is natural to consider the probability P(β,ε)(C,a,m)(v, w) of
absorption in (w, am) when starting from (v, am−1). This quantity can be easily
and efficiently computed using the so-called fundamental matrix [2]. Meanwhile,
the term τ@v+(a,m) provides a mechanism to mitigate artificial “boundary effect”
behavior for m = M . Furthermore, (5) leads to a very clean temporal coherence
property and a very straightforward physical interpretation.
Regarding the symmetry properties enumerated above, the unit and zero
terms in (5) merely express property i), viz. an equivalence among different spa-
tial transitions and the underlying topology of the temporal digraph. Property
ii) is embodied in the following
Proposition 1. If a0, a|a|−1 ∈ a′ ⊆ a, then
P(β,ε)(C,a′,1) · · · · · P(β,ε)(C,a′,|a′|−1) = P(β,ε)(C,a,1) · · · · · P(β,ε)(C,a,|a|−1). uunionsq (6)
The import of the proposition is that for any (β, ε) there is a temporally
coherent family of time-inhomogeneous Markov chains associated to C. The tem-
poral coherence manifests in two ways: first, the transition probabilities for any
given time interval correspond to temporally coherent random paths over that
interval; second, transition matrices in successive intervals can be coherently
multiplied.
Note that the proposition does not depend on the specific form of (5): in-
deed, the “exp(−β ·∆τ)” terms could be replaced with fairly generic alternatives
while still satisfying property ii). 6 However, these particular terms are required
in order to jointly satisfy properties iii) and iv): i.e., memorylessness and self-
consistency in the limit∆τ ↓ 0 (the latter of these entails that we cannot multiply
the exponentials by some non-unit constant). That is, apart from the numerical
underflow-avoiding ε (which is itself introduced in an obvious way), the form
of (5) is completely dictated by the temporal digraph structure in concert with
obviously desirable symmetries. 7
The limit β →∞ evidently amounts to considering so-called greedy walks [16]
(more generally, in the regime β > 0, “spatial” transitions are more likely than
“temporal” transitions), and as we shall see the general construction embeds the
temporal coherence of random paths in a more faithful and conservative way than
the sorts of series of “projected snapshots” that have heretofore characterized
attempts such as [13,18,15,5] to map a DCN into a time series of graphs and/or
provide a substrate for random walks.
While in principle this is not an issue, in numerical practice this leads to floating-
point underflow. Taking ε > 0 avoids this problem without significant side effects.
6 The∆τ dependence is necessary and in the context of information flows is a plausible
approximant (for small values) to the conditional Kolmogorov complexity of the
intervening computation.
7 For a weighted DCN, normalizing so that the sum of outbound weights equals either
d+ or zero as appropriate and replacing the first case in (5) with the corresponding
normalized weight gives an easy and consistent generalization.
A Markov model for inferring flows in directed contact networks 7
The proposition above provides a mechanism for nominally optimizing the
choice of a. WriteN := |C|,M := |a|, and suppose that a is such that ∣∣C|[am,am+1)∣∣ ≈
N/M . Now |V (T (C|[am,am+1)))| ≈ 2(n + N/M). Meanwhile, the complexity of
computing P(β,ε)(C,a,j) is dominated by a matrix division step of the form (I−Q)\R,
where Q is the block of P
(β,ε)
(C,a,j) whose rows and columns both correspond to
transient states, and R is the block whose rows correspond to transient states
but whose columns correspond to absorbing states. There are approximately
n+ 2N/M transient states and exactly n absorbing states, so the complexity of
computing (I − Q)\R is O(n(n + 2N/M)ω−1), where we take matrix multipli-
cation and inversion to have complexity exponent ω > 2 (in practice ω = 3 for
dense unstructured matrices). Since there are M − 1 multiplications, the overall
complexity of the RHS of (6) is O(Mn(n+ 2N/M)ω−1). It is easy to check that
arg minM Mn(n+2N/M)
ω−1 = 2(ω−2)N/n, and taking this value for M yields
a nominal complexity that is linear in N . In particular, the only reason to take
M  N/n is if the complexity of the other operations involved in the overall
computation dominates the linear algebra complexity: it is cheaper to invert and
multiply a lot of small matrices than to invert and multiply a few large matri-
ces. Taking M to be at least comparable to N/n also has the obvious benefit of
providing a more detailed picture of the dynamics of C than a smaller value.
Before proceeding further, let us exhibit the basic construction:
Example 1. Consider yet again the DCN depicted in figure 1. Let τj = j for
1 ≤ j ≤ 4, ε 1, a = {0, 2.5, 5} and a′ = {0, 5}. We then have that the entries
of P
(β,ε)
(C,a′,1) are as shown in figure 2 and (using · in matrices as shorthand for 0)
P(β,ε)(C,a′,1) =

eβ+1
(e4β+1)(eβ+1)
· e5β
(e4β+1)(eβ+1)
e4β
(e4β+1)(eβ+1)
·
· 1
e2β+1
· · e2β
e2β+1
· · 1 · ·
· · eβ
eβ+1
1
eβ+1
·
· · e2β
(eβ+1)2
eβ
(eβ+1)2
eβ+1
(eβ+1)2

=

1
e4β+1
· · e4β
e4β+1
·
· 1 · · ·
· · 1 · ·
· · · 1 ·
· · · eβ
eβ+1
1
eβ+1
 ·

1 · · · ·
· 1
e2β+1
· · e2β
e2β+1
· · 1 · ·
· · eβ
eβ+1
1
eβ+1
·
· · · · 1

= P(β,ε)(C,a,1) · P(β,ε)(C,a,2),
so we can see that as β increases (equivalently, the temperature decreases) the
most likely transitions become those corresponding to temporally coherent paths
in which spatial arcs are greedily traversed. Meanwhile, consider the digraph D
with edges (s(c), t(c)) for c ∈ C as well as loops (v, v) for v ∈ [n]: the adjacency
matrix of D has nonzero entries in the (2, 3) and (2, 4) positions as well as in the
sparsity pattern of P(β,ε)(C,a′,1). These spurious (2, 3) and (2, 4) entries correspond
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to nonexistent temporally coherent paths in C, highlighting that P gives a more
detailed and accurate picture of C than D. uunionsq
s, t = 1
2
3
4
5
τ = 0 1 2 3 4 5
Z−1(1,1) max(ε, e
−4β)
Z−1(1,1)
Z−1(5,2) max(ε, e
−β)
Z−1(5,2)
Z−1(2,3) max(ε, e
−2β)
Z−1(2,3)
Z−1(4,4) max(ε, e
−β)
Z−1(4,4)
Fig. 2. Entries of P
(β,ε)
(C,a′,1) not in {0, 1} for C := {(1, 4, 1), (5, 4, 2), (2, 5, 3), (4, 3, 4)}
and a′ = {0, 5} are indicated along with solid arcs (gray for spatial arcs; black for
temporal arcs); unit entries correspond to dashed arcs.
3.1 Embeddability
Since a DCN lives in continuous time, it is natural to ask if the Markov chain
P(β,ε)(C,a,m) corresponds to a continuous-time Markov process, i.e., if there is a well-
defined notion of instantaneous probability rate for all times. This is an instance
of the so-called Markov embeddability problem [10], and this instance can be
answered effectively for various situations of practical interest.
First suppose that no two contacts occur at once. Then the embeddability
problem reduces to the case of a single contact for n = 2, and this in turn follows
from the following readily verifiable identity for p ∈ (0, 1):
log
(
1− p p
0 1
)
= log(1− p) ·
(
1 −1
0 0
)
.
However, simultaneous contacts can obstruct embeddability. It suffices again
to consider the case n = 2: here a stochastic matrix is embeddable iff its de-
terminant is positive. But with C := {(1, 2, 0), (2, 1, 0), (1, 2, τ), (2, 1, τ)} and
a = {−1, τ/2, 2τ}, a quick calculation shows that detP(β,0)(C,a,1) < 0 for β > 0.
The following result follows immediately from Proposition IV.3 of [10] and
takes both of the preceding cases into account. The algorithm of §V.B of [10]
can be used to estimate a Markov generator when it exists.
Proposition 2. If T (C) is acyclic, then P(β,ε)(C,a,m) is embeddable. uunionsq
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4 Data reduction and anomaly detection
In this section, we show how the Markov model performs data reduction well
enough to be used as a practical anomaly detector.
We used data from an adversarial challenge in DARPA’s Transparent Com-
puting program. Specifically, we considered a DCN C formed from N ≈ 3.4 · 106
read and write events spanning a period of four days and derived in turn from
data produced by the CADETS tool [8]. We ignored process IDs, resulting in
n = 418 files (of which 88 were processes). We curated the ground truth data set
for this challenge to exclude events that were demonstrably not present in our
input data (e.g., directory changes). This left 54 APT events, each given with an
accurate timestamp with a precision of 1 second. To translate each APT event
record into a form suitable for evaluation, we found the set of contacts that occur
within ±1 second (note that this is conservative), and extracted the subset of
these for which either the source or target are a process or file in the APT event
record. This yielded a set G ⊂ C of 216 ground truth contacts distributed over
the 54 APT events.
We set β to the average inter-contact time (as suggested in an earlier foot-
note), ε to the square root of machine epsilon, and a to 10-second windows (with
M = 28423). Writing P(m) ≡ P(β,ε)(C,a,m) and (f ∪g)(X) := f(X)∪g(X), we define
for respective probability and relative frequency thresholds λ, µ ∈ (0, 1)
Iˆ(m) := (pi1∪pi2) ({(j, k) : [Pjk(m) > λ] ∧ [|{m′ : Pjk(m′) > λ}| /M < µ]}) (7)
with pii indicating a projection onto the ith factor, and
I(m) := (s ∪ t) ({c ∈ G : τ(c) ∈ [am, am+1)}) (8)
That is, Iˆ(m) is the set of indices corresponding to origins or destinations of
information flows spanning the mth time window that are probable (as defined
by λ), and for which this probability is also rare (as defined by µ); meanwhile,
I(m) is the set of indices corresponding to sources or targets of ground truth
events during the mth time window. 8
From (7) and (8) we can define both Boolean and natural number versions
of detection metrics. The Boolean version uses J>K := 1 and J⊥K := 0 a` la
δ>+bool(m) :=
r[
Iˆ(m) 6= ∅
]
∧
[
Iˆ(m) ∩ I(m) 6= ∅
]z
;
δ⊥+bool(m) :=
r[
Iˆ(m) 6= ∅
]
∧
[
Iˆ(m) ∩ I(m) = ∅
]z
;
δ⊥−bool(m) :=
r[
Iˆ(m) = ∅
]
∧ [I(m) 6= ∅]
z
;
δ>−bool(m) :=
r[
Iˆ(m) = ∅
]
∧ [I(m) = ∅]
z
. (9)
8 In many cases either the source or the target of a ground truth event does not exist.
For example, the userspace commands hostname and put /tmp/netrecon correspond
to the (process name,filename) pairs (hostname,∅); and (∅, /tmp/netrecon). By
way of comparison, the command rm -f /tmp/netrecon.log corresponds to the
pair (rm, /tmp/netrecon.log).
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The natural number analogues of (9) are (suppressing m for brevity)
δ>+nat :=
∣∣∣Iˆ ∩ I∣∣∣ ; δ⊥+nat := ∣∣∣Iˆ ∩ Ic∣∣∣ ; δ⊥−nat := ∣∣∣Iˆc ∩ I∣∣∣ ; δ>−nat := ∣∣∣Iˆc ∩ Ic∣∣∣ .
(10)
From these we get in turn the usual detection metrics shown in Figures 3 and
4, i.e. true positive rate (or recall) and false positive rate
TPR :=
∑
m δ
>+(m)∑
m δ
>+(m) +
∑
m δ
⊥−(m)
; FPR :=
∑
m δ
⊥+(m)∑
m δ
⊥+(m) +
∑
m δ
>−(m)
,
(11)
and positive predictive value (or precision) and negative predictive value
PPV :=
∑
m δ
>+(m)∑
m δ
>+(m) +
∑
m δ
⊥+(m)
; NPV :=
∑
m δ
>−(m)∑
m δ
⊥−(m) +
∑
m δ
>−(m)
.
(12)
Fig. 3. True (left) and false (right) positive rates as defined in (11).
It is obvious from Figures 3 and 4 that the results are broadly insensitive
to the probability threshold λ, though it is easy to pick an optimal value using
the technique of [7]. Similarly, a cursory analysis (not shown) indicates that the
value of β is only important up to several orders of magnitude (this is because
potential information flow probabilities strongly tend to be either very near or
bounded away from unity in practice, a fact which we also exploit in setting the
probability threshold λ). For the value µ = 10−3, we see that a clear majority
of the APT events are detected (by either version of the metrics) with a false
positive rate below 2 percent (again, by either version). The results indicate that
the model is a sufficiently effective data reduction technique (in particular, the
negative predictive value is essentially perfect) to be a useful anomaly detector.
In fact, of the 57 (out of 418) files which are targets of high-probability
potential information flows in the model, 27 fall below the µ = 10−3 level and
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Fig. 4. Positive (left) and negative (right) predictive values as defined in (12).
have backtracks with fewer than 20 (or for that matter, 90) vertices. From these
27, 6 (in 3 pairs) correspond to the 3 executables which the APT wrote to /tmp
from its initial foothold.
5 Remarks
The Markov model depends in an essential way on the detailed structure of
the underlying DCN. Experiments not detailed here have shown that inserting
even 1% of random contacts seriously degrades the data reduction and anomaly
detection characteristics of the model. This is a good thing, though: it indicates
that the model captures the most important aspects of flows from contact data.
We can also run the model in reverse by simply applying the map (s, t, τ) 7→
(t, s,−τ) beforehand. However, this idea of analyzing reverse information flow
remains to be fully explored, as does a related notion of a taint calculus proposed
by George Cybenko.
An interesting perspective on the model is that it gives us a time-varying ge-
ometry. If d denotes an arbitrary metric on probability distributions, we get an
induced metric for a given time window of the form d(v, w) := d(Pv·,Pw·), where
Pv· is the vth row of P. This in turn allows us to do things like time-dependent
clustering. Analysis of the variation of information [12] between subsequent clus-
terings would give additional principled insight into dynamical behavior.
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